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Perception and cognition are highly interrelated. Given the inﬂuence that these systems
exert on one another, it is important to explain how perceptual representations and cog-
nitive representations interact. In this paper, I analyze the similarities between visual
perceptual representations and cognitive representations in terms of their structural prop-
erties and content. Speciﬁcally, I argue that the spatial structure underlying visual object
representation displays systematicity – a property that is considered to be characteristic of
propositional cognitive representations. To this end, I propose a logical characterization of
visual feature binding as described byTreisman’s Feature IntegrationTheory and argue that
systematicity is not only a property of language-like representations, but also of spatially
organized visual representations. Furthermore, I argue that if systematicity is taken to be
a criterion to distinguish between conceptual and non-conceptual representations, then
visual representations, that display systematicity, might count as an early type of concep-
tual representations. Showing these analogies between visual perception and cognition is
an important step toward understanding the interface between the two systems.The ideas
here presented might also set the stage for new empirical studies that directly compare
binding (and other relational operations) in visual perception and higher cognition.
Keywords: systematicity, generality constraint, conceptual content, non-conceptual content, attention
INTRODUCTION
Perception and cognition are tightly related. Perceptual informa-
tion guides our decisions and actions, and shapes our beliefs. At
the same time our knowledge inﬂuences the way we perceive the
world (Brewer and Lambert, 2001). To the extent that perception
and cognition seem to share information, it seems there is no sharp
divisionbetween the realmof cognitive abilities and that of percep-
tual abilities. An example is visual perception. Visual processing is
composed of different stages (Marr, 1982): early, intermediate, and
late vision. Roughly, at early stages of the visual system, processes
like segregation of ﬁgure from background, border detection, and
the detection of basic features (e.g., color, orientation, motion
components) occur. This information reaches intermediate stages,
where it is combined into a temporary representation of an object.
At later stages, the temporary object representation is matched
with previous object shapes stored in long-term visual memory to
achieve visual object identiﬁcation and recognition. While early
visual processes are largely automatic and independent of cogni-
tive factors, late visual stages aremore inﬂuencedbyour knowledge
(Raftopoulos, this issue). Examples of cognitive inﬂuence on how
we perceive the world – that modulates late vision – are visual
search and attention (Treisman, 1993). Knowing the color or shape
of an object helps a person to quickly identify that particular object
in a cluttered visual scene (Wolfe and Horowitz, 2004). Phenom-
ena like visual search highlight the fact that visual perception at
later stages depends on both sensory and cognitive factors. Late
vision is at what philosophers call the personal level: we have con-
scious access to information represented at this stage and we can
exploit it for action planning and thinking (Lamme, 2003; Block,
2005). This is apparently not the case for early visual stages, which
occur at a subpersonal level, without a person being aware of the
information being processed at that stage. Intermediate stages,
on the other hand, are probably accessible at a personal level. The
degree of representational awareness occurring at this stage is com-
monly identiﬁed with phenomenal consciousness (Lamme, 2003;
Raftopoulos and Mueller, 2006): we get a gist of the perceived
scene, but it is not possible to retrieve detailed information of the
objects’ features. It is a matter of debate to what extent interme-
diate stages of visual processing are inﬂuenced by our knowledge
(i.e., are cognitively penetrable). Some authors argue that those
stages are purely visual (Raftopoulos and Mueller, 2006) and that
the transition between pure perception to cognition occurs only
at later visual stages, when temporary object representations are
matched for recognition and identiﬁcation. In this paper, I will not
propose an argument for whether early and intermediate stages
of visual perception are cognitively penetrable. However, I would
like to stress that some of the common properties between visual
perception and cognition that Iwill consider already occur at inter-
mediate stages, thus, casting doubt on the claim that mid-level
vision is purely perceptual.
Cognitive information inﬂuences perceptual processes, but, at
the same time, cognitive processes depend on perceptual informa-
tion (Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998). Recent work in philosophy
brought new vigor to the hypothesis originally proposed by British
Empiricists that cognition is inherently perceptual (Prinz, 2002):
cognitive/conceptual tasks have their roots in perception and they
rely on perceptual mechanisms for their processing. Such theoreti-
cal proposals are supported by empirical ﬁndings frompsychology.
Work on concept acquisition shows that functions (e.g., catego-
rization, inference) that are associated with cognition have their
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basis in perceptual systems (Barsalou, 1999) and that percep-
tual and conceptual processes share common mechanisms (Pecher
et al., 2004). The basic hypothesis is that a concept is represented
by means of a simulation at the sensory level of an experience
of that to which the concept truly applies. For example, to rep-
resent the concept APPLE1, perceptual systems for vision, action,
and touch partially produce the experience of a particular apple.
Taken together,work on the inﬂuence of knowledge on the charac-
ter of one’s perceptual experience and on perceptual information
shaping one’s conceptual abilities provides evidence for perception
and cognition being related systems.
Though it seems to be common ground that cognitive and per-
ceptual representations inﬂuence each other, they are not taken to
be the same kind of representations. Neurophysiological studies
distinguish different functional areas for sensory and cognitive
systems. Those areas process speciﬁc inputs and specialize in
different kinds of information processes (Zeki, 1978; Felleman
and Van Essen, 1991). And distinct sensory areas can be treated
as separate modules (Barrett, 2005) that deal with their speciﬁc
representational primitives.
From a philosophical point of view, visual perception and
cognition process information by means of representations that
differ in both their structure and content (Heck, 2007; Fodor,
2008). One of the main characteristics of cognitive states, para-
digmatically of thoughts, is that they have a propositional combi-
natorial structure that satisﬁes the requirement of the Generality
Constraint (Evans, 1982). The Generality Constraint describes the
pervasive ability of humans to entertain certain thoughts that they
have never had before on the basis of having entertained the com-
ponents of these new thoughts in other preceding situations. For
example, from the fact that a person can think that the sky is blue
and the car is gray, she can also think that the sky is gray and the
car is blue, even if she has never had this thought before. The new
thought depends on her conceptual ability to combine already
acquired concepts in different ways. This regularity of human
thinking is explained by appealing to the fact that thoughts are
mental representations with a sentential combinatorial structure
(Fodor, 1975). Thoughts are built up by combining primitive con-
stituents according to propositional rules. The thought ‘the car
is gray’ depends on the tokening and combination of the con-
cepts CAR and GRAY and the rule of composition for the verb
‘to be.’ Recombination of concepts in cognitive processes displays
a constituent structure. The constituent structure of thought is
such that whenever a complex representation is tokened its con-
stituents are simultaneously tokened. Failure to represent car or
grayness leads to failure to represent that the car is gray. The appeal
to the constituent structure of cognitive representations allows us
to explain a further property of these representations: their sys-
tematicity (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988). Systematicity, similar to
the Generality Constraint, describes the human ability to entertain
semantically related thoughts. For example, the ability to entertain
a certain thought about cars is connected to the ability to enter-
tain certain other thoughts about cars: thoughts like ‘the car is
1I follow the common practice in philosophy to capitalize terms that refer to
concepts.
gray’ and ‘the car is blue’ share the same constituent ‘car.’ That is,
the semantic systematicity of thought is explained by postulating
a system of representations with a combinatorial syntax.
Systematic recombinations are necessary to satisfy the Gen-
erality Constraint but not sufﬁcient. In fact, systematicity is a
weaker requirement than the Generality Constraint since it lacks
the“generality”part. According to the Generality Constraint, once
a thinker can entertain a thought, elements of this thought could
be in principle indeﬁnitely recombined with every other appropri-
ate concept that a person possesses. This requirement is not part
of systematicity, since it leaves open whether it is in principle pos-
sible that a ﬁnite type of systematicity exists (Fodor and Pylyshyn,
1988). For what concerns the analysis of the structure of visual
representations, I will mostly focus on whether those representa-
tions implement a systematic structure of constituents. I will then
discuss the “generality” requirement in the analysis of the content
of visual representations.
Acceptance of the Generality Constraint, or the weaker system-
aticity requirement, also affects how we characterize the content of
cognitive andperceptual representations. Philosophers distinguish
between two types of content: conceptual and non-conceptual
content (Evans, 1982; Bermúdez, 2007). Typical cases of mental
states with conceptual content are cognitive mental states, like
thought, belief, desire, and so on: their content – what is thought,
believed, and desired – is a function of the concepts a person pos-
sesses, where concepts are taken to be the constituents of thoughts
and other cognitive states. Mental states with non-conceptual con-
tent, on the other hand, are states the having of which does not
depend on the subject’s possessing any of the concepts required
to specify the content of that state. Perception, both personal and
subpersonal, is considered a paradigmatic example of states with
non-conceptual content. In other words, to have the thought that
an apple is red, one has to possess the concepts involved in that
thought, but to have a perceptual experience characteristic of see-
ing a red apple one does not need to possess the concepts involved
in the speciﬁcation.
One way of distinguishing conceptual and non-conceptual
content appeals to a mental representation’s satisfaction of the sys-
tematicity requirement (Toribio, 2008; Camp, 2009). It has been
argued that perceptual representations, speciﬁcally visual repre-
sentations, do not satisfy the requirement of systematicity, and,
hence, unlike cognitive representations, do not have conceptual
content (Heck, 2007). The argument is based on the idea that
visual representations have a pictorial nature. Pictorial theories
equate visual representations to images or maps. Like images or
maps, visual representations are spatially characterized: at each
point in an image or map a speciﬁc trait (color, shape, etc.) occurs.
Furthermore, like images or maps, visual representations have a
holistic character. Unlike cognitive representations, there is no
unique structured propositional representation that determines
the content of a visual representation. There aremany distinct pos-
sible decompositions of the same image, such that it is impossible
to both identify which are its constituent parts and disentangle
the role of these parts in the building up of the pictorial repre-
sentation. Thus, visual representations, like maps, seemingly lack
the syntactic structure of constituents typical of cognitive repre-
sentations. The lack of a constituent structure entails that visual
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representations arenot systematic. Satisfying systematicity is a nec-
essary condition on satisfying the Generality Constraint. For the
reasons above, visual representations do not seem to satisfy sys-
tematicity, and hence the Generality Constraint. Therefore, they
have a content of a different kind than the content of cognitive
representations: they have non-conceptual content.
If visual perception and cognition do indeed have different
structural properties and content, then it becomes difﬁcult to
understand how perceptual representations are “translated” into
cognitive representations. This is both an empirical and theoret-
ical question. From the philosophical point of view, ﬁnding out
the relationship between perception and cognition will be of ben-
eﬁt to explain phenomena as different as concept formation and
acquisition, belief justiﬁcation, and demonstrative thinking, each
of which partly depends on perceptual information.
In this paper, I will focus on commonalities between visual per-
ception and cognition that might help explain the communication
between those systems. In the ﬁrst part, I will show that the spatial
recombination underlying visual object recognition satisﬁes the
requirement of systematicity. The analysis will take into account
the so-called Feature Integration Theory (Treisman and Gelade,
1980); a model that explains visual object representation by con-
sidering the spatial nature of visual representations. Although
Feature Integration Theory characterizes visual representations
as spatially organized, it differs from pictorial theories of visual
representations, since it does not commit to the view that visual
representations are holistic. In fact, visual representations can be
seen as states of the visual system that can be neuronally speci-
ﬁed, such that each part of an object representation can be spelled
out by considering the different neuronal activations (Treisman
and Gelade, 1980; Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998). Each neuronal
activation roughly corresponds to a part, or primitive constituent,
of the representation. Thus, one can decompose an object rep-
resentation into its primitive constituents and analyze whether
a systematic structure of constituents is displayed by visual spa-
tial recombinations (Tacca, 2010). In the second part, I will argue
against the claim that visual representations have non-conceptual
content. Based on the analysis in the ﬁrst part of the paper, I
will propose that, if one takes systematicity to be a necessary
requirement for having conceptual content, visual representations
might be an early type of conceptual representations. I conclude
that understanding the link between perception and cognition
requires considering whether they satisfy common requirements
in termsof structure and content. These similaritiesmight be at the
basis of the translation of perceptual representations into cognitive
representation and elucidate the mechanism of their interaction.
PRIMITIVE VISUAL FEATURES AND THE BINDING PROBLEM
Recombination in cognitive processes depends on operations on
primitive constituents. A primitive constituent is an entity that
corresponds to the smallest meaningful representation carrying
relevant information for the processing of more complex rep-
resentations. Different theories posit different types of primitive
constituents (Smolensky, 1990; Fodor, 1998). However, there is
agreement that the primitive mental representations involved in
thought and other cognitive processes, like belief and desire, are
concepts. According to an atomistic perspective, concepts cannot
be further decomposed into more primitive elements and as such
they are the building blocks of thoughts (Fodor, 1975). However,
others have argued that concepts can be further decomposed into
their perceptual components (e.g., Barsalou, 1999). For example,
the concept APPLE can be decomposed into its constituent con-
cepts:COLOR,TEXTURE,SHAPE,etc.At the same time, each part
can be further decomposed into more elementary constituents like
GREEN, BROWN, SMOOTH, and ROUND. Those elementary
constituents are taken to be symbolic perceptual representations
stored at late perceptual stages that become part of cognitive
recombinations. Therefore, they share with cognitive representa-
tions systematicity, compositionality, and productivity (Barsalou,
1999). In the following, I will show that intermediate visual rep-
resentations that contribute to object perception but are not yet
stored at late visual stages also display systematicity.
The hypothesis that concepts have a structure of constituents
that involves perceptual representations is based on anatomical,
physiological, and psychophysical evidence for the existence of
distinct representations for primitive visual features.Neurobiolog-
ical (Zeki, 1978; Livingstone and Hubel, 1988; Felleman and Van
Essen, 1991) and psychophysical studies (Treisman and Gelade,
1980) report the existence in visual areas of so-called feature
maps. Feature maps code for speciﬁc object features, like color,
motion, and orientation. They are also topographically organized;
namely, they represent a speciﬁc feature and the speciﬁc location
in which the feature occurs in the visual ﬁeld. Thus, any visual
object we perceive is ﬁrst decomposed into its primitive com-
ponents and only later those components are recombined into
a coherent object representation. But what makes color, motion,
and orientation count as primitive features not further decom-
posable? To provide an answer to this question is important, since
if we can show that there is an empirically reasonable standard
for primitive recombinable features, then we can challenge one
of the central motivation for thinking that visual perception does
not display systematicity and that the content of visual representa-
tions is non-conceptual; namely, the claim of pictorial theories for
which there is no unique decompositions of visual representations
into a proper structure of constituents.
The deﬁnition of a primitive visual feature not further decom-
posable depends on experimental consideration (Wolfe, 1998).
First, a primitive feature allows for efﬁcient visual search when
embedded in a cluttered scene of unlike distracters. The efﬁciency
of visual search is indicated by the so-called “pop-out” of the tar-
get that is independent of how many items are present in the
visual ﬁeld. Second, a primitive feature supports effortless texture
segregation. For example, a region of vertical lines in a ﬁeld of
horizontal lines will be immediately segregated from the back-
ground and perceived as a ﬁgure. Color, orientation, and motion
justify the criteria of efﬁcient search and effortless segmentation,
and are, thus, primitive features. Furthermore, these features are
represented by different visual cortical areas, each of which is
retinotopically organized. Taken together, neurophysiological and
psychophysical ﬁndings uncover the fact that visual features are
the primitive constituents of visual object representations.
Once primitive visual features have been individuated, the sub-
sequentmain question is how those features are combined. In light
of the complexity of natural visual scenes, it is striking that features
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are almost never miscombined in our perception. In fact, this is
even remarkable for the simplest possible scenes, such as one with
a red-horizontal bar and a green-vertical bar and another one with
a green-horizontal bar and a red-vertical bar. These scenes con-
tain identical features that are combined in different ways. The
challenge consists in individuating objects by their unique combi-
nation of features, so as to distinguish, for example, the red-vertical
bar from the green-horizontal bar. Jackson (1977) described the
problem of feature recombination as the Many-Property problem.
Research in vision science has approached this problem under the
label of“bindingproblem”(Roskies,1999).An example of what the
binding problem involves comes from studies of visual conjunc-
tion search (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). A typical case of feature
integration is to show a subject a scene in which red-vertical bars,
red-horizontal bars, green-horizontal bars, and one green-vertical
bar are presented together. The subject is asked to identify the
green-vertical bar. In order to detect the right target, something
like a comparison between the right orientation and the right color
has to occur. It has been shown that in the case of identiﬁcation
of objects that share different features (orientation and color in
the example case) selective attention is at play (Treisman, 1996).
Further evidence for the binding problembeing solved by an atten-
tional mechanism comes from studies of illusory conjunctions in
healthy subjects (Treisman and Schmidt, 1982) and patients suf-
fering from Balint’s syndrome (Robertson, 2003). Healthy subjects
are asked in a laboratory setting to report properties of visually pre-
sented stimuli under high attentional load. Results show that they
report a high number of illusory conjunctions. For example, when
shown a screen with blue squares and red triangles, they report
wrong recombinations of presented features, e.g., a blue triangle.
A high rate of illusory conjunctions occurs if similar experiments
are performed with Balint’s syndrome patients. These patients suf-
fer, among other things, from an attentional disruption, providing
more evidence for the role of attention in successful binding.
The reported ﬁndings support the so-called Feature Integration
Theory (Treisman and Gelade, 1980). Feature Integration Theory
is one of the most inﬂuential models of visual feature binding that
considers the role of attention and the spatial layout of feature
maps as the basic ingredients for successful feature binding. Other
inﬂuential models have been proposed for explaining the bind-
ing process, such as the hypothesis of binding by synchrony that
considers synchronized neuronal mechanism as the basic binding
mechanism (Engel et al., 1991). Furthermore, besides the spatial-
attentional mechanism posited by Feature Integration Theory,
also object-based attention might be necessary to integrate fea-
tures (Blaser et al., 2000). The hypotheses of binding by spatial
attention, synchrony, and of the role of object-based attention are
not mutually exclusive (Tacca, 2010). It might be that all these
factors are at play during the binding process. Indeed, empirical
studies show the relation between spatial attention and synchrony
(Fries et al., 2001) and between object-based and spatial attention
(Scholl, 2009) in building up an object representation. Here, I will
only focus on the role of spatial attention to bind features, in order
to show that spatial representations display systematicity in a way
similar to cognitive-sentential representations.
According to Feature Integration Theory, selective attention
acts as the active binding mechanism. Whenever a person focuses
her attention on a speciﬁc object location in the visual ﬁeld, the
features at that location are represented in the corresponding loca-
tion in the feature maps. By selecting all the features occupying a
speciﬁc location, attention integrates these into a coherent object
representation. More speciﬁcally, the focus of attention selects an
object location within a topographically organized master map
of location (Treisman, 1993) or saliency-map (Koch and Ullman,
1985). This saliency-map represents the saliency of objects at each
location of the visual ﬁeld, because it combines the information
about all features’ saliency from all the speciﬁc featuremaps,which
it receives via topographically organized connections from the fea-
turemaps.Within each featuremap, the saliency at a given location
is determined by two classes of factors (Wolfe, 1998): (i) bottom-
up saliency, that is, the local feature gradient (Koch and Ullman,
1985); and (ii) top-down factors, like the match between a stimu-
lus feature and the features of the object that a person is currently
searching for (Wolfe, 1998).
Independently of whether the saliency of individual locations
is governed by bottom-up or top-down factors, the saliency repre-
sentation in the saliency-map is always generated by combining the
outputs from feature maps in a fashion that preserves topography.
That is, the saliency-map receives information about the differ-
ent object locations – suppose that locations are indexed with i,
l, m, n, etc. – and their conspicuity values from distinct feature
maps. If locationi, signaled by the feature mapα, is the same as
locationl (i= l), signaled by the feature mapβ, they will activate
the same portion of the saliency-map. The saliency value of this
location will then depend on the conspicuity of both locationi and
locationl. The saliency-map only codes for saliency at a given loca-
tion. Thus, the saliency-map represents the locations of objects but
has no information about which features occur at those locations.
In order to recover which features determine the object’s shape
and surface, information within the topographic feature maps has
to be selected for binding and further processing of object iden-
tity. A “winner take-all” mechanism selects the location in the
saliency-map that is the most salient at any given moment (Koch
and Ullman, 1985). This determines where the focus of attention
will next move. Via topographically ordered feedback connections
from the saliency maps to the corresponding locations in the fea-
ture maps, the features at that location (e.g., features occurring
at both locationi in the feature mapα and locationl in the feature
mapβ, since i= l) are jointly selected for further processing, and, in
this way, bound. These integrated features are stored as temporary
representations – called by some authors an object-ﬁle (Kahneman
et al., 1992) – in which their constituting information of location
is indexed. Hence, in models based on Feature Integration The-
ory, the representation of objects’ locations is fundamental for
integrating their features.
In this framework, the difference between saliency being gov-
erned by bottom-up or top-down factors amounts to the distinc-
tion between exogenous and endogenous attention. Exogenous
attention is governed by stimulus property: it is attracted by
the conspicuity of an object in the perceived scene. If you are
attending a seminar and a ﬂy suddenly enters into the room, you
will immediately spot and follow it. No matter how much you
are interested in the seminar. Endogenous attention is governed
by a subject’s tasks and plans. You want to wear your favorite
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pullover and you go through the content of your messy closet to
ﬁnd it. You will drive your attention to the location where you
thought the pullover should be, if you are lucky your search is
over, but, as often happens, you will have to scan through differ-
ent locations before you can ﬁnd it among all the other similar
cloths.
Note that, in the sequence of processes postulated by Feature
Integration Theory, the binding process is separate from the rep-
resentation of location saliency. In principle, binding can be dis-
rupted without a disruption of the saliency representation. Thus,
in this framework, attention and binding can come apart. To illus-
trate a scenario in which such dissociation occurs, let us assume
that we selectively interrupt the feedback connections from the
saliency-map to the feature maps, leaving everything else intact.
Then, there will still be a most salient location selected in the
saliency-map and only the ﬁnal process in the above sequence
will be disrupted. Suppose that the perceived scene is one with
a green-vertical bar and a red-horizontal bar. Object features are
represented in feature maps according to their location: greeni,
verticall, redm, and horizontaln. Information about feature loca-
tions is sent to the saliency-map, which computes the most salient
location. In the saliency-map, locationi and locationl activate the
same area (locationi = locationl), since they bring information
about the same object location, and locationm and locationn acti-
vate the same area (locationm = locationn) that is different from
the location of the object signaled by locationi and locationl.
Suppose that the location of i and l is the most salient, then
attention will be directed to this location and a signal to select
features “indexed” i and l will be sent to the feature maps. Since
the feedback connections from the saliency-map to the feature
maps are disrupted, features in the feature maps belonging to the
same location cannot be selected. The feature maps will encode
for features and their locations, but there is no selective feedback
signal that routes only those features from the selected location
to the next step of object processing that binds them. This might
result in perceptual misbinding because features from many loca-
tions are spuriously sent on to higher-level object processing. In
fact, one possibility is that psychophysical manipulations lead-
ing to illusory conjunctions (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) work
by interrupting the feedback from the saliency-map to the fea-
ture maps, just as in this thought experiment. For proper binding,
information about features occupying the same identical loca-
tion has to be routed from the feature maps to higher processing
stages.
Also note that, even with disturbed saliency representation, and
thus disturbed attention, some feature binding (even if erroneous)
occurs. An empirical example for this can be found in Balint’s syn-
drome patients. Spatial attention in these patients is disrupted,
yet they still report a (wrong) recombination of features. Thus,
even without spatial attention, some erroneous form of binding
can occur. The fact that attentional selection and feature bind-
ing are tightly related, yet distinct processes, is of importance for
the analysis of the binding process in the logical terms that are
proposed in the next section.
Brieﬂy, the main ingredients of Feature Integration Theory
are the representation of primitive features, their spatial location,
and attention. The interaction of these elements gives rise to the
perception of objects in a scene in which features are correctly
conjoint. This might solve the Many-Property or binding problem
at least in the case of visual object representation.
SYSTEMATIC RECOMBINATION OF SPATIALLY ORGANIZED
REPRESENTATIONS
Models based on Feature Integration Theory describe visual object
representations as the outcomes of recombinations of primitive
visual constituents. This contrasts with pictorial theories of visual
perception in philosophy (e.g., Heck, 2007; Fodor, 2008) that
argue that visual representations have a holistic nature. Visual
representations, like images or maps, can be decomposed in
many different ways: to each visual representation might cor-
respond a different decomposition of constituents. That means
that any kind of decomposition of a visual representation into
its constituents makes the same contribution to the ﬁnal object
representation. The decomposition of, for example, a visual rep-
resentation of a ﬂower into (petals, stem, leaves) is as good as
the decomposition (part of petal1, roots, sepal, stalk). Therefore,
visual representations are, unlike cognitive representations, not
canonically decomposable (Fodor,2007):while the decomposition
of a thought representation allows only a unique decomposi-
tion – e.g., ‘John loves Mary’ decomposes into JOHN, LOVES, and
MARY – iconic representations have inﬁnitely many decomposi-
tions, none of which is canonical. Having a structure of primitive
constituents depends on the individuation of the unique parts of a
canonical decomposition. Since visual representations seemingly
fail to canonically decompose, they lack a structure of primi-
tive constituents. To implement a structure of constituents is a
pre-requisite for explaining the systematic behavior of cognitive
processes. The relation of constituency is deﬁned as a mereolog-
ical relation; namely, as a relation of parts to whole (Fodor and
Mclaughlin, 1990): every time the expression E is tokened, its con-
stituents <e1,. . ., en> are tokened, too. In a classical account of
thought processes, systematicity results from processes that are
sensitive to the structure of constituents: the ability to entertain
related thoughts depends on the fact that different combinations
of constituents have the same syntactic structure. As an example,
the thoughts ‘John loves Mary’ and ‘Mary loves John’ share the
same structure, even if the constituents are differently arranged.
According to the pictorialists, because of the holistic character
of visual representations, those representations fail to implement
such a structure of constituents, and, as a consequence, they do
not display systematicity.
Empirical evidence casts doubt on the main assumption of
pictorial theories: that perceptual representations have a holistic
character, and therefore lack systematicity. Evidence from vision
science shows that visual object representations depend on the
recombination of neuronally speciﬁed primitive features. These
features can be uniquely determined in terms of neuronal activa-
tions, and they are represented in distinct feature maps. Experi-
mental considerations make clear that features represented in the
feature maps are primitive and not further decomposable. Object
representations then depend on the spatial recombination of those
features. It seems plausible that such recombinations display sys-
tematicity; namely that visual scenes that are structurally related
(e.g., to see a red-vertical bar to the left of a green-horizontal
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bar and vice versa) share the same primitive visual features (i.e.,
‘green,’ ‘horizontal,’ ‘red,’ and ‘vertical’). In order to show that this
is indeed the case, one has to ﬁrst argue that visual representa-
tions implement a mereological structure of constituents, such
that every time an object representation is tokened its primitive
features are tokened, too; and, second, that the visual system imple-
ments a systematic structure of constituents; namely, that visual
features make the same contribution in structurally related visual
scenes.
The analysis of the type of structure implemented in the process
of binding by attention, as described by Feature Integration The-
ory, can be given in logical terms (Clark, 2004a; Tacca, 2010).
Binding involves predication and identity: features are consid-
ered to be the predicates of the same sensory individual that,
in the case of Feature Integration Theory, is the object location.
The reason for introducing identity is that a pure conjunction of
terms might lead to different representations of the same scene,
each of which would be valid. Consider, for example, the sim-
ple visual scene with a red-vertical bar and a green-horizontal
bar. Its decomposition only by means of conjunction would be:
(red and vertical and green and horizontal). The recombination
of those features could lead to two distinct visual scenes: one in
which there are a red-vertical bar and a green-horizontal bar,
and one in which there are a red-horizontal bar and a green-
vertical bar. This kind of ambiguity does not occur in object
perception. The binding process normally produces a unique
representation of the objects in the environment. This unique
representation is partly achieved when features are processed as
occurring at the same location. Ideally, the process within the
visual system can be seen as doing something like scanning a
location and applying a speciﬁc tag to the features occurring at
that location (maybe by keeping track of that location within
object ﬁles). For example, all the features occurring at the loca-
tion i are indexed or tagged with i, and all features occurring
at a distinct location m are indexed with m. If the location m
and i do not overlap; namely, features in i and m do not occur
at the same location, then features are bound into two sepa-
rate object representations. In real-world perception of cluttered
visual scenes, attention serially selects one location after the other,
binding the features at each of them. To this extent, the role of
attention is to secure identiﬁcation: it determines when features
have a common subject matter and allows for the identiﬁcation
of, and discrimination between, different objects (Clark, 2004a).
Object location is, thus, the key element that secures a successful
binding of features. This process can be logically characterized as
follows:
<red-vertical bar>:
(at loci is R; at locl is V; loci = locl ∴at loci is R and V)
<green-horizontal bar>:
(at locm is G; at locn is H; locm = locn ∴at locm is G and H)
The logical characterization of visual feature integration has
the advantage of outlining the structure of the binding oper-
ations. This characterization is an important tool to compare
the spatial structure of visual representation with the proposi-
tional structure of thought. I argue that the structure of visual
representation resembles the structure of constituents of thought.
In fact, the schema above indicates that the representation of an
object depends on its constituents being explicitly represented. If
not, the derived object representation is only partial. To deter-
mine whether vision has a systematic structure of constituents,
it is necessary to investigate whether structurally related visual
scenes – i.e., scenes that involve different recombinations of objects
or features – share the same constituents, and whether visual con-
stituents contribute in the same way, during the binding processes
operating on structurally related scenes, to determine the objects
of which they are parts. If visual binding mechanisms meet those
requirements, then the binding process has a systematic struc-
ture of constituents. A systematic recombination of the example
visual scene – a green-horizontal bar to the left of a red-vertical
bar – requires that at least one of the features belonging to one
of the objects in the scene is shifted, so that, as a result, this
feature will change its position. Consider a visual scene with a
red-horizontal bar to the left of a green-vertical bar. The repre-
sentation of the example visual scene and the structurally related
scene just described can be schematized as follows:
∗<green-horizontal bar to the left of a red-vertical bar>:
(at loci is R; at locl is V; loci = locl ∴at loci is R and V)
(at locm is G; at locn is H; locm = locn ∴at locm is G and H)
∗∗<red-horizontal bar to the left of a green-vertical bar>:
(at locj is R; at lock is H; locj = lock ∴at locj is R and H)
(at locb is G; at locc is V; locb = locc ∴at locb is G and V)
The above conﬁgurations show how visual features can be
recombined in a systematic fashion by means of combining pred-
icates (features) in a formal language. However, according to Fea-
ture Integration Theory, vision does not combine its constituents
by means of propositional rules but according to the features’
spatial locations. Therefore, it is necessary to provide an argu-
ment to explain how visual processes implement the structure just
described by means of spatial recombinations.
When two instantiations of the same feature occur at differ-
ent locations in the world, the feature map coding for that feature
will be active. Particularly, it will signal that this speciﬁc feature
occurs at two distinct locations, corresponding to its locations
in the world. In the case of (∗) and (∗∗), the same color maps
for green and red, and the same orientation maps for horizon-
tal and vertical are active. But the colors are swapped in the two
scenes, leading to different object conﬁgurations. The difference
between the two conﬁgurations is encoded in the change of the
activated locations in the color maps. The color map signaling
green will be active, to simplify, in its “left side” when represent-
ing the location of the green feature in scene (∗), while it will be
active in its“right side”when representing green in scene (∗∗). The
converse applies for the feature map coding for red. Thus, when-
ever two visual scenes are structurally related (as in this case),
attentional scanning through the scenes will select object loca-
tions, thereby leading to a diverse binding of the features in the
structurally related scenes. This results in different object rep-
resentations in the case of (∗) and (∗∗). The binding process
is such that primitive constituents are simultaneously tokened
with the complex representation. In other words, lacking one
of the constituents will result in failure of the binding process.
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Thus, feature binding turns out to be more than an associative
process that merely links inputs to outputs. In fact, visual bind-
ing by spatial attention displays a systematic competency: ﬁrst, the
visual system implements amereological structure of constituents,
rather than processing arbitrarily correlated inputs. Second, the
proposed model of visual feature binding displays a systematic
structure of constituents. As outlined above, structurally related
visual scenes share the same, but differently arranged, primitive
features.
Systematicity is a property displayed by both sentential-
cognitive representations and spatial representations. This con-
clusion is in contrast with previous works in philosophy (Clark,
2004b; Fodor, 2008), according to which only representations with
a language-like format combine constituents in a way such that
a small set of primitive representations can be recombined to
form different types of complex representations. In particular,
Clark (2004b, p. 571) suggests that sensory states “have something
like a subject–predicate structure, though they are not sentential
and do not manifest most of the hallmarks of compositional-
ity.” In a classical account, a systematic structure of constituents
is a distinctive feature of, and tightly related to, compositionality
(Fodor, 1998). The requirement of systematicity is explained in
terms of the syntactic structure of constituent recombination in
thought, whilst compositionality concerns the content of propo-
sitional representations. The main idea is that the content of
a thought depends on the content of its constituents and the
way they are syntactically combined. The reason Clark argues
that visual representations do not have traits that satisfy com-
positionality is because those representations, arising from the
binding of primitive features, provide the basis for the concep-
tual identiﬁcation of particulars but do not themselves involve
conceptual identiﬁcation; namely, visual primitive representations
do not contribute their content to the content of the ﬁnal object
representation.
I argue, instead, that if a system has a structure of contentful
constituents, then this system displays at least one of the hallmarks
of compositionality: systematicity. It can also be shown that visual
representations satisfy a deﬂationary notion of compositional-
ity – a weaker form of compositionality than the one mentioned
here (Tacca, 2010). A deﬂationary account only requires that (i)
vision has a systematic structure, and that (ii) visual primitive
constituents have a speciﬁc content. But it remains neutral on
which types of semantic properties compose, as required by a clas-
sical account of compositionality (Fodor and Lepore, 2001). This
is a consequence of the spatial, rather than sentential, character
of visual representations. In fact, as Clark notices, visual repre-
sentations are indeed not sentential. This seems to be the case
for both primitive features that are bound at intermediate visual
stages and for more complex representations that occur at late
visual stages.
The spatial nature of visual representations also makes the
systematicity of visual representations different from the sys-
tematicity of cognitive representations. The explanation of the
systematicity of thought involves two parts (Cummins et al.,
2001): (i) it entails that having a thought requires having men-
tal representations that express that thought. This also applies
to visual representations, since to represent a visual object, the
primitive representations that code for its characteristics have to
be tokened; and (ii) it entails that mental representations have
a language-like combinatorial syntax (and semantic). This is not
the case for visual representations. Spatial recombinations under-
lying visual object representation lack the operational repertoire
of language-like recombinations. Visual feature binding requires
the integration (and spatial grouping) of local, primitive fea-
tures. To this extent, operations like conjunction and identity
are required. But it is not possible to characterize any of the
processes involved in binding in terms of other logical oper-
ations. No “visual negation” or “visual disjunction” take place.
There is no feature integration that is the negation of any of the
integrations that occur within the visual system, and, in con-
trast with feature conjunction, an explicit feature disjunction
does not exist in vision: either features are conjoint or they are
not combined at all. In sum, vision does not possess the rich
propositional structure that higher-cognitive processes seem to
have.
The fact that visual representations do not have a proposi-
tional nature highlights the difference in combinatorial processes
between the visual and perceptual systems but it does not rule out
the possibility that systems with different combinatorial struc-
tures can implement the same combinatorial requirement, even if
in different ways. This is the case for visual representations that,
even if they do not allow for propositional recombinations, dis-
play systematicity. Thus, the requirement of systematicity can be
considered as a general property that does not depend on the type
of operations performed on the primitive constituents.
THE CONTENT OF INTERMEDIATE VISUAL
REPRESENTATIONS
Another difference between visual perception and cognition
concerns the content of their representations. While cognitive
representations have conceptual content, the content of per-
ceptual experience is better described as non-conceptual con-
tent. Non-conceptual content is often deﬁned in the following
way (Bermúdez and Cahen, 2011): a mental state has non-
conceptual content if and only if the subject of that state does
not need to possess the relevant concepts required to specify its
content.
How to deﬁne then the non-conceptual content of perceptual
states? Heck (2007) argues that what kind of content percep-
tual and cognitive states have is a question about what kinds of
representations those states involve. Heck’s analysis starts from
the premise that the conceptual content of beliefs is structured
in a way that fulﬁlls the requirement of the Generality Con-
straint. The debate over non-conceptual content then turns out
to be about whether the cognitive abilities one exercises when
one thinks that tomatoes are red are also exercised when one
veridically perceive a ripe tomato, and whether it would be
impossible for one to perceive the tomato as one does were
one not able to think as one can. Thus, the question of what
kind of content one should take perceptual experience to have
has to be answered by investigating the structural character-
istics of perceptual representations. The content of perception
will be conceptual only if the Generality Constraint is satis-
ﬁed (Heck, 2007). But, according to Heck, this is not the case,
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since visual representations, as described by pictorial theories,
have a spatial structure that violates even the weaker require-
ment of systematicity. Satisfying systematicity is a necessary con-
dition on satisfying the Generality Constraint. Therefore, since
visual representations do not display systematicity, their content
is non-conceptual.
The analysis proposed in this paper of how visual representa-
tions spatially combine leads, instead, to a different conclusion: the
appeal to the spatial structure of vision seems to count in favor of
the conceptualist thesis, rather than providing a strong argument
for the existence of representationswith a non-conceptual content.
This is because visual representations satisfy the requirement of
systematicity – i.e., a necessary condition to satisfy the Generality
Constraint. Systematicity is a weak-syntactic reading of the Gen-
erality Constraint that states that there is a certain kind of pattern
in our cognitive capacities. In this form, the requirement of sys-
tematicity describes representational composites as depending on
syntactic recombinations involving the same constituents. Recom-
binations of cognitive representations entail that a person has
conceptual abilities (Mclaughlin, 2009). In the case of visual per-
ception, systematic recombinations of primitive features involve
the ability of a subject to identify particular features. This abil-
ity might correspond to an early type of conceptual ability, since
visual representations, like cognitive representations, are consti-
tuted by primitive constituents that make the same contribution
in structurally related representations. Particularly, the representa-
tion of features within feature maps is such that whenever a feature
is tokened in the feature map (e.g., “red”), this feature will con-
tribute in the same way to the ﬁnal object representations in which
the color red is involved (e.g., a red-vertical bar, a red-horizontal
bar). While the contribution of the feature representation is the
same in different object representations, those representations will
differ from each other as a function of the spatial conﬁguration
of their features, since, for different object representations, feature
locations are different. This is similar to what occurs in proposi-
tional representations, for which, although the same constituent
(e.g., the concept RED) contributes in the same way to thoughts
regarding red things, the ﬁnal complex representations depend on
the syntactic conﬁgurations of the primitive constituents.
However, unlike propositional representations, the possession
of systematic perceptual skills is not sufﬁcient to satisfy the Gen-
erality Constraint in its strong form, and, thus, not enough to
establish both necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for the concep-
tuality of perceptual representations. The idea behind the Gen-
erality Constraint is that conceptual representations involve not
only a systematic recombination of primitive constituents but also
an abstract grasp on the way things are. Thought representations,
and propositional representations in general, are not constrained
to anymode of access (Peacocke, 2001).We can, in principle, enter-
tain an indeﬁnite number of thoughts. This is based on the idea
that human thoughts have anunboundcompetence that is not lim-
ited by our performance (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1988; Tacca, 2010).
Instead, our perceptual representation of the world is bound to the
limit of the perceptual system in use. We cannot perceive an indef-
inite number of visual scenes, since what we can perceive depends
on the physical constitution of our visual system. There is no such
thing as an abstract visual competence.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that failure to satisfy the Gener-
ality Constraint in its fullest version – that is, by showing both
systematic combinability and abstract competence – does not
exclude intermediate visual representations from being a speciﬁc
type of conceptual representations. Perceptual representations
might count as an early type of conceptual representations that
will become more abstract only with full possession of conceptual
resources. These early types of conceptual representations display
systematic recombinability – a necessary even if not sufﬁcient con-
dition for a person to possess conceptual abilities. Moreover, the
deﬁnition of visual representations as early types of conceptual
representations will also provide a link between human and ani-
mal cognition. Some of the criteria analyzed here, particularly
systematicity, have been reported as basic criteria for showing
concept possession in animals, too (Newen and Bartels, 2007).
Thus, the distinction of the content of perception and cognition
based on satisfaction of systematicity does not show that the con-
tent of conscious perceptual experience is nonconceptual. At best,
one can argue that satisfaction of the requirement of systematic-
ity shows that intermediate stage visual representations, the ones
involved in the binding process, might be an early type of concep-
tual representations. The abstract grasp on ways of representing
the world, required by the full satisfaction of the Generality Con-
straint, is then a criterion to distinguish fully conceptual–cognitive
representations from early types of conceptual–perceptual rep-
resentations; rather than to distinguish conceptual from non-
conceptual representations. However, while visual representations
at intermediate stages have properties that characterize their con-
tent as conceptual, it is still possible that visual representations
at early visual stages (e.g., feature segregation, boundary rep-
resentation) have non-conceptual content. At this stage, there
is hardly any inﬂuence from cognitive processes, and recombi-
nation of primitive constituents that satisfy the requirement of
systematicity does not seem to occur. Thus, it might be that the
transition between representations with nonconceptual and con-
ceptual content occurs already between early and intermediate
visual stages.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To claim that perception and cognition are tightly related makes
sense only if one can explain how those systems, which are indi-
viduated in different brain areas and process different types of
information, communicate. In this paper, I argue that visual rep-
resentations share a structural property with cognitive representa-
tions; namely, that spatial recombination of visual representations
into an object representation displays systematicity. This conclu-
sion contrasts the traditional view in philosophy, according to
which only sentential-cognitive representations implement a sys-
tematic structure of constituents, and it is in line with ﬁndings in
physiology and psychology of how the visual system creates object
representations.
The fact that visual perceptual representation, even if not sen-
tential, displays systematicity poses a further problem for philo-
sophical theories that see systematicity as a hallmark of repre-
sentations with conceptual content. I argue that if one takes the
satisfaction of this requirement as a necessary condition for hav-
ing conceptual content then the content of visual representations
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amounts to an early type of conceptual content that does not
allow for the same kind of abstraction that is typical of human
cognitive abilities. This type of early conceptual and perceptual
content might be a characteristic that humans have in common
with animals.
Moreover, showing that visual representations display system-
aticity makes it easier to see how visual perception and cognition
might relate and share representational information. In fact, one
of the problems of claiming that visual perception and cognition
have different structure and content is that it becomes unclear
how they can share information. It might be that implementing a
systematic structure is a basic way of recombination that is shared
by different brain areas. Thismight be a general code of assembling
information that makes more efﬁcient its processing in different
modalities.
To conclude: my analysis adds to the debate on how perception
and cognition are related. It shows that visual representations and
cognitive representations display the same structural properties
and might have an analogous type of content. This conclusion,
based on theoretical grounds, can be tested empirically in future
experiments that apply analogous manipulations to relational
operations in visual perception and higher-order processes (e.g.,
Reverberi et al., 2011). Moreover, my ideas might lay a theoretical
foundation for novel exchanges between the ﬁelds of perceptual
and cognitive psychology.
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